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A B S T R A C T
Scientists represent their world, grouping and organizing phenomena into classes by means of concepts.
Philosophers of science have historically been interested in the nature of these concepts, the criteria that inform
their application and the nature of the kinds that the concepts individuate. They also have sought to understand
whether and how different systems of classification are related and more recently, how investigative practices
shape conceptual development and change. Our aim in this paper is to provide a critical overview of some of the
key developments in this philosophical literature and identify some interesting issues it raises about the pro-
spects of the so-called “special sciences”, including psychiatry, psychology, and the mind-brain sciences more
generally, to discover natural kinds.
1. Introduction
Scientists represent their world, grouping and organizing phe-
nomena into classes by means of concepts. Philosophers of science have
historically been interested in the nature of these concepts, the criteria
that inform their application and the nature of the kinds that the con-
cepts designate. They also have sought to understand whether and how
different systems of classification are related and more recently, how
investigative practices shape conceptual development and change (e.g.,
Feest & Steinle, 2012; Kendig, 2016a). Our aims in this paper are to
provide a critical overview of some of the key developments in this
philosophical literature and identify some interesting issues it raises
about the prospects of the so-called “special sciences”, including psy-
chiatry, psychology, and the mind-brain sciences more generally, to
discover natural kinds.
We begin, in Section 2, with an historical overview of philosophical
thinking about classification. Although philosophers and scientists
generally agree that the aims of classification are broadly epistemic,
they disagree about the nature of the kinds of things the world contains,
the appropriate methods for individuating kinds and grouping them
into categories and the relationship between the resulting classification
systems and the world. One overarching aim of scientific classification
is the discovery of what philosophers refer to as “natural kinds”, and we
move on in Section 3 to consider different understandings of this
concept. We explain that debates about whether different areas of sci-
ence are able to achieve “the natural kinds ideal” hinge not only on how
we define the concept of a natural kind, but also on the stability of the
phenomena under study in the areas of science being considered. It also
depends crucially, as we explain in Section 4, on the conceptual and
methodological practices of investigators in those areas of science.
2. Principles of classification: a brief historical overview
2.1. Conventionalism
Human beings impose conceptual order on their world. In the most
basic terms, we are born into a world of language users; learning the
meanings of words requires the abilities to detect objects having certain
properties in the world, to recognize similarities and differences among
those objects with respect to those properties and to understand that
things that others identify using the same name share certain properties
in common. We learn these basic rules of classification and assign
things that share properties in common to groups having unique names.
Common examples of groups include stars, mammals, trees, beliefs and
feelings. We learn that stars have the basic properties of being luminous
and visible in the night sky and that beliefs are things that humans and
some non-human animals have that can be assigned a truth value.
Sometimes we place unlike things into the same group—we misclassify
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either accidentally or intentionally (perhaps, in some cases, to get clear
about the rules).
The concepts that we learn—that ordinary people use to classify the
world—are sometimes referred to as “folk” concepts (e.g., Churchland,
1981). These categories are so-called because while they enable or-
dinary language users to effectively navigate the day-to-day world, they
arise from convention. We learn how to use concepts and we may use
them without explicitly questioning what they mean or what the things
that we group similarly actually share in common beyond what we can
detect by means of our senses. Folk concepts and classification systems
based exclusively on convention are widely regarded as insufficient
stopping points for classifying our world if our aims are explanation,
prediction, intervention and control. Yet, what principles should guide
the development of a classification system? In this section, we consider
some of the key answers to this question on offer in the philosophical
literature.
2.2. Essentialism
One of the earliest answers to how to properly classify things in the
world that remains influential today originated with the Ancient Greek
philosophers. In the Categories, Aristotle develops a system of classifi-
cation rooted in a doctrine known as essentialism, which has its origins
in Platonic thought. According to Plato, we exist in a world of sensible
objects, but our senses do not reveal the true nature or essence—the
Forms—of those objects. In order to move beyond the realm of sensory
appearances and grasp the essential nature of things, we must engage in
the method of dialectic (Grube, 1974, 165), and evaluate particular
cases of things in the world in order to abstract the fundamental
properties they share in common. Aristotle explicitly engages in this
method in the Categories (Ackrill, 1963), putting forward a set of ca-
tegory names (i.e., concepts) and providing definitions for them in
terms of properties that inhere in and are essential to the things to
which those names apply (i.e., essences). For example, he specifies what
it is to be a man – what the essential properties of being human are—by
distinguishing those properties (e.g., being an animal) from ones that
are typically ascribed to individual men (e.g. proper names) or acci-
dentally associated with the concept “man” (e.g., two-footed).2 Each
Aristotelian category constitutes a set of severally necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for a thing to be a member of that category (e.g.,
Hull, 1965).
Several features of Ancient essentialism are worthy of note. First,
the method of specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for cate-
gory membership aims to advance classification beyond ordinary folk
understandings of the nature of things. Plato was explicit that grasping
the underlying reality of nature was something that only dialectically
trained philosophers could do. A second noteworthy feature is that once
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership is
identified, the resulting conceptual category is intended to be stable; by
engaging in dialectic, one arrives at the correct classification system for
understanding the true nature of reality. Plato's Forms and Aristotle's
Categories were the endpoints of dialectical inquiry, and they were
understood to be unchanging foundations of knowledge akin to the
axioms and definitions of geometry and mathematics (e.g., Williams,
2001).3
2.3. Empiricism
The British empiricist, John Locke, put forward a different basis for
an essentialist classification system. Locke noted that the objects of our
everyday experience have properties detectable by the senses and we
use those properties to differentiate objects from each other and place
them into groups to which we apply specific names. He referred to
groupings based on sensible properties of objects and shaped by social
convention as “nominal essences” and differentiated them from hidden
microstructural properties that he believed constituted the “real” es-
sences of things (Locke, 1689[1975], 417). Locke explains, for example,
that although we customarily associate a name like “gold” with in-
stances of metal having a specific color, texture and density, these
features cannot be used to individuate the real underlying micro-
structural properties on which these sensible properties depend (Locke,
1689[1975], 419).
As an empiricist, Locke believed that the scientific method was
fundamental for advancing human understanding beyond “nominal
essences” towards classification systems based on “real essences”. Yet,
he was skeptical that science could illuminate the microstructural
properties of objects and how those properties mechanistically give rise
to “nominal essences”. Insofar as he described the material world as
being in a constant state of flux, he seemed open to the possibility that if
science were to advance, classification systems informed by a knowl-
edge of the “real essences” of things may be subject to on-going revision
(cf. Locke, 1689[1975], 419).
The Scientific Revolution prompted later empiricists, including
William Whewell and John Stuart Mill, to be more optimistic about the
prospects of science for discovering “real essences” and developing
“real” classification systems. By the 18th century, classification systems
had been developed in sciences like botany, zoology and mineralogy.
Criticisms of the “naturalness” of those classification systems and pro-
posed revisions from scientists working in these scientific domains
prompted Whewell and Mill to try to clarify the principles that should
inform scientific classification. At that time, philosophers of science
regarded Newtonian mechanics as exemplifying the proper method for
how to do science (see Herschel, 1830 [2009]; Whewell, 1840 [2014]).
It was widely accepted that Sir Isaac Newton had employed the method
of induction; he started with the observation of many cases of phe-
nomena to determine the important features that like cases shared in
common; he then used those observations as a basis for inferring causes
or mechanisms, arriving at a set of laws that could explain a wide range
of mechanical phenomena.
Whewell (1840 [2014]) acknowledged that different systems of
classification may serve different purposes. For example, in his day,
whales were classified by whalers as fish, but given that female whales
(cows) had mammary glands and nursed their young, they clearly were
not “fish”, but rather, “suckling beasts or mammals” (1840 [2014],
456). Scientists, according to Whewell, should aim to go beyond clas-
sification systems that are characteristic of “common practical life” and
2 The examples of categories that Aristotle puts forward in his treatise are of
more fundamental types, such as substance and quantity. However, throughout
the text he uses the example of “man” to illustrate what features are essential to
being human and which features may be accidentally ascribed that are not
essential to how the concept of man is defined.
3 According to philosopher Michael Williams (2001), the Ancient Greeks be-
lieved that knowledge once arrived at was stable. The model for such stability
was mathematics; from a set of first principles that included axioms and defi-
nitions one could deduce other true claims by means of mathematical proof.
The Ancient Greeks believed that just so long as they could identify similarly
(footnote continued)
secure foundations for philosophy, logical proofs could be used to deduce other
true claims, and those claims would be as secure as were their foundations.
With the rise in the use of the inductive method following the Scientific
Revolution, however, and the fact that inductive inferences are ampliative
because the claims arrived at by means of induction go beyond what the pre-
mises actually support, there was a growing awareness that the foundations of
scientific knowledge are not stable. Moreover, there was a growing appreciation
of the fallibility of science that emerged prior to (e.g., Bacon, 2000), during and
after the Scientific Revolution consistent with the idea that the scientific
method can sometimes fail, and scientific claims are indeed revisable in light of
new information. Indeed, as we explain later in this section, John Stuart Mill,
insofar as he claimed that the discovery of “real kinds” will be unending in
science, seems to have been amenable to the idea that scientific concepts and
classification systems will never be stable.
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identify “coherent and systematic collection[s] of properties” that
constitute “Natural Systems” of classification that individuate the
“Natural Affinit[ies]” of things (1840 [2014], 470).
Whewell, however, noted that not every classification system pro-
duced by science will necessarily be “natural”. Scientists themselves
may fail to recognize fundamental properties that ideally ought to in-
form the development of a classification system. This may happen due
to improper use of the inductive method or technological limitations.
Whewell provides the example of Swedish botanist Carl Linneas's
(1707–1778) taxonomy of plants, which divided them into groups
based on pistil and stamen number. Whewell remarks that such artifi-
cial characteristics are used as a basis for classification primarily when
natural relationships that hold between things are not yet known, and
artificial classifications are subject to revision as natural relationships
are illuminated. Noting the reasons botanists provided for rejecting
Linnaeus's classification system, Whewell remarks that “it is plain that
they seek something, not of their own devising and creating; —not
anything merely conventional and systematic; but something which
they conceive to exist in the relations of the plants themselves;
—something which is without the mind, not within; —in nature, not in
art; —in short, a natural order” (1840 [2014], 474). Artificial classifi-
cation systems like that of Linnaeus, could, however, according to
Whewell, provide roadmaps for natural classification systems by “plac
[ing] us in a situation where the detail is within our reach” (1840
[2014]480).4
Mill (1874), like Whewell, regarded the process of developing a
classification system as tentative and proceeding on a case-by-case basis
in which two things are compared and then more things are added to
the comparative process as a means to determine their similarities and
differences. This tentative process is supposed to be inductive and fa-
cilitate the discovery of “general truths, that is, truths applicable to
classes” (Mill, 1874, 807). According to Mill, only important properties
of things that may correspond to laws ought to be grouped together. For
example, we may look out at the animal kingdom and decide to classify
animals on the basis of their color; so, we place black bears and jaguars
in one group and seals and brown bears in another. Yet, such groupings
are not, from Mill's perspective, important, or “real” because they do
not tell us much about other properties of animals—color is not con-
nected to more fundamental features of animals, such as their physical
structures or their behaviors. Mill thought that in order for a classifi-
cation system to pick out “real” as opposed to “artificial” kinds, the
groupings ought to home in on similarities and differences connected to
“many other important particulars” of the kinds of things being clas-
sified (1847, 802). Additionally, Mill believed that the process of dis-
covering “real kinds” – i.e., identifying the important properties of
kinds and developing classification systems that individuate “real
kinds”, is ongoing in science, which is consistent with the idea that
classification systems and scientific knowledge more generally are not
stable.5
2.4. Logical empiricism
Logical empiricists in the 20th century also were interested in the
foundations of scientific classification and the relationships between
different taxonomic frameworks, theoretical terms and kinds under
study in different areas of science. For example, in his paper
Fundamentals of Taxonomy (1959/1965), Carl Hempel sought to specify
the logical and methodological foundations of classification in em-
pirical science and to tease out a set of implications for psychiatric
classification. Hempel claimed that scientific classification systems go
through at least two discrete stages of development. His understanding
of the first, what he referred to as a “descriptive stage” of scientific
classification, was informed in part by the doctrine of operationalism
advocated by the physicist Percy Williams Bridgman (e.g., Bridgman
1927, 1938, 1952). In this stage, according to Hempel, scientists aim to
specify uniform and publicly observable testing operations for scientific
terms, so that a given term may only be applied if a given test yields a
specified outcome. For example, if psychologists want consistent and
publicly verifiable criteria of application for a psychological term like
“stress”, they might develop a test like the Trier Social Stress Test, and
then specify the kinds of observable behaviors, including sweaty palms
and increased heart rate, which must be elicited by a subject during the
test in order to warrant application of the term “stressed” to that sub-
ject. Hempel claimed that this first stage of classification is “de-
scriptive”, insofar as scientists must appeal to observable “surface”
features of phenomena in order to operationally define concepts and
place them into groups (see also Chang, 2019; Feest, 2005).
Operationally defined categories were intended to facilitate com-
munication among scientists having different theoretical perspectives
who were “engaged in a common research project” but lack a shared
vocabulary. Yet they served only as an important practical starting
point for the development of scientific classification systems. As those
empiricists before him, Hempel claimed that sciences should strive to
move away from taxonomies based on “observable” features of phe-
nomena to conceptual taxonomies having “systematic or theoretical
import” (Hempel, 1965, 146). While he agreed with Mill that scientific
categories must identify “important” and extensive clusters of proper-
ties that had a “high probability” of being associated with each other,
he also thought they must reflect underlying regularities in the subject
matter in a given scientific domain that could be expressed in terms of
laws and general theories that facilitated explanation, prediction and
understanding (Hempel, 1965, 146). Discovering such general laws or
theories would prompt revisions to scientific taxonomies such that the
categories would ultimately correspond to bona fide divisions in the
natural world, or “natural kinds”.
Hempel puts forward classification in biology as an example of the
kind of historical shift from descriptive to theoretical classification he
has in mind. Taxonomies in biology originally classified organisms with
respect to observable and predominantly morphological features.
However, morphology is no guide to natural divisions in the biological
order, and in response to the development of the theory of evolution by
natural selection, these early taxonomies were replaced by taxonomies
based on phylogenetic relationships (Hempel, 1965, 147). If we con-
sider instead classification in psychology and psychological concepts
like “stress”, “memory”, “attention” and “fear”, that have been his-
torically defined in terms of observable changes in behavior in response
to specific stimuli or tests, it is possible that advances in a different area
of science, namely, neuroscience, may illuminate neurophysiological or
other underlying factors that may prompt their replacement. However,
it remains an open question what happens to concepts in science and
entire systems of classification as more is learned about underlying
causal structures or mechanisms. As we explain in the next section,
there are good grounds for thinking that there is no one size fits all
model for scientific classification and conceptual change in science, nor
are the kinds under study in different areas of science subject to the
same kinds of conceptual challenges.6
3. The natural kinds ideal
Even a brief analysis of historical views of classification like that
provided in Section 2 reveals a general consensus that if the aims of
classification are broadly epistemic—to grasp the underlying structure
of reality (i.e., beneath appearances) and/or, to explain, predict and
4 For further discuss of Whewell on scientific classification, see Quinn (2017).
5 For further discussion of Mill, see Khalidi (2013); Magnus (2012, 2014).
6 See for example, Andersen (2010); Bloch-Mullins (2020a, 2020b); Brigandt
(2003); Ereshefsky (2004); Feest and Steinle (2012); Franklin-Hall (2015);
Griffiths (2004); Khalidi (2013); LaPorte (2004); Nersessian (2008).
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control, then the kinds a classification system individuates should be
“real” or “natural”. While philosophers generally agree that science
aims to discover natural kinds, they disagree about how to conceive of
such kinds and respond differently to the question of whether science is
capable of discovering them (see Bird & Tobin, 2018). In 20th century
philosophy, a lot of ink has been spilt aiming to clarify what kinds of
kinds there are and debating the metaphysical, ontological, and epis-
temological statuses of these kinds. In this section, we focus on a re-
presentative subset of natural kind concepts and consider arguments for
and against the idea that sciences like biology and “special” or “human”
sciences like psychology and psychiatry, can develop classification
systems that track natural kinds.
Natural kinds are understood to share a basic set of properties in
common. First, they are things that exist naturally in the world and
mind-independently of us; their existence does not hinge on our ability
to conceptually individuate them and they existed prior to our dis-
covering them. Plato's Forms, Locke's microstructural properties,
Whewell's natural affinities, Mill's “real kind” are all regarded by their
proponents as real and (with Plato's Forms as the exception), bona fide
parts of the natural order. Second, natural kinds share a core set of
properties in common; these properties may be at the microstructural
level, but they do not have to be (see e.g., Kincaid and Sullivan, 2014;
Borsboom et al., 2018; Boyd, 1991, 1999; Kendler, Zachar, & Craver,
2011; Khalidi, 2013; Magnus, 2012; Mellor, 1977; Tabb & Schaffner,
2017). It also is widely assumed that once a conceptual category picks
out a “natural kind” it permits scientists to make inductive inferences,
formulate generalizations about that kind and discover other natural
kinds (see Boyd, 1999; Kendig, 2016a, 2016b; Khalidi, 2013; Magnus,
2012). To take a paradigmatic example of a natural kind from chem-
istry, members of the category ‘chemical element’ are separated from
non-members in terms of a single defining feature—their atomic
structure or number, i.e., the number of protons found in the nucleus of
every atom of a given element. Each element has a unique atomic
number and thus, to say that chemical elements are natural kinds is to
say that there is a natural difference that sets them apart from other
things. Depending on their intuitions, philosophers of science make
claims about the “naturalness” of the kinds that are discoverable in
different areas of science from the perspectives of realism, con-
structivism, conventionalism, pragmatism, and pluralism. In this sec-
tion, we will consider each of these perspectives in turn.
3.1. Essentialist kinds
Essentialists are realists about natural kinds. Plato and Aristotle
believed that things in the world have essences that are detectable when
one engages in directed consideration of similarities and differences
among things in the world and identifies the fundamental proper-
ties—i.e., the essence of those things (e.g., Ackrill, 1963; Bird, 2010;
Devitt, 2008; Ellis, 2001, 2008; Hull, 1965). On this Classical essenti-
alist view, then, natural kind categories are groupings that consist of
members that are said to share an essence that exists behind the world of
appearances. Locke's essentialism, in contrast, is consistent with the
idea that an essence is a set of intrinsic, fixed properties that underlie
and cause observable features unique to a given kind. Modern philo-
sophers often construe essentialism as a mixture of Classical and Em-
pirical versions in claiming that essences have “necessary and sufficient
properties that identify the member of that kind and from which all
identifying characteristics of that kind arise in all members of that ca-
tegory” (Kendler et al., 2011, 1144). Proponents of the essentialist view
put forward chemical elements as a standard example to defend their
view. For instance, gold can be correctly identified solely on the basis of
its atomic number of 79. Its atomic structure gives rise to unique ob-
servable features, such as its color, malleability, and melting point,
making it easily distinguishable (Devitt, 2008; Ellis, 2001).
However, some philosophers of biology argue that the essentialist's
assumption that a single essence can give rise to the properties
attributable to members of a kind is ill-suited for biological phenomena
(Boyd, 1991, 1999; Hull, 1965). David Hull (1965), for example, cri-
ticizes the idea that a stable set of jointly sufficient and severally ne-
cessary conditions for category membership could be provided for each
species given that their features change throughout evolutionary his-
tory. Boyd (1991, 1999) argues that biological species cannot be said to
share an essence due to evolutionary processes such as mate selection
and genetic drift. Genetic and environmental factors also give rise to
different phenotypes among individuals within a given species popu-
lation (Boyd, 1999).
Boyd's arguments against essentialism with respect to biological
kinds have been extended to models of disease. While genetic disorders
result from a single causal factor, other kinds of diseases involve a
number of causal factors, spanning from the molecular to the physio-
logical, anatomical, behavioral and environmental levels. For example,
psychiatric research reveals that a given mental disorder can manifest
through a spectrum of symptoms from person to person, suggesting that
such disorders do not arise from a single cause (Kendler et al., 2011). As
Zachar (2015, 289) notes, a person's symptoms may “evolve over
time...certain symptoms coming into foreground, and then receding
into the background as other symptoms take their place” and “inter-
actions between symptoms can also generate new symptoms.” An-
swering to the diversity and instability of biological kinds are perhaps
the most challenging criticisms that essentialists face, because they are
in conflict with the aim of developing a system of classification based
on a stable set of necessary and sufficient conditions for categorizing
natural kinds.
3.2. Homeostatic property clusters
As an alternative to essentialism, Richard Boyd suggests a realist but
non-essentialist view of natural kinds. He introduces the ‘homeostatic
property cluster theory’ (HPC-Theory), through which natural kinds
exist “not by any set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but instead
by a ‘homeostatically’ sustained clustering of properties or relations”
(Boyd, 1999, 141). On this account, natural kind categories consist of
members that share co-occurring properties that reliably cluster to-
gether due to shared underlying causal mechanisms that sustain the
property clusters. The HPC view is supposed to sidestep the issue that
critics have associated with essentialism failing to accommodate the
diversity and adaptability of biological kinds. Boyd (1999) remarks that
it is not necessary for members of an HPC kind category to share every
single trait, leaving room for variation between members of that kind.
Boyd (1991, 142) considers biological species to be a paradigmatic
example of HPC kinds insofar as a set of “imperfectly shared and
homeostatically related morphological, physiological and behavioural
features […] characterize […] members” of a species. To take an ex-
ample, “certain anatomical structures, body type, and predatory beha-
viours form a homeostatic property cluster called ‘tiger’” and the co-
occurrence of these features is maintained by homeostatic mechanisms
that result from the exchange of genetic material through interbreeding
and reproduction (Boyd, 1991, 288–289).
According to Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection,
phenotypic traits arise from variations within mechanisms occurring
internally (e.g., genetic) and externally (e.g., environmental, ecolo-
gical). Not every species member will be subjected to the same me-
chanisms; thus, different phenotypic traits arise at both the population
level and within a given species population. Boyd (1999) notes that the
HPC-Theory allows for phenotypic variations between species cate-
gorized in what he refers to as higher-level classifications. A higher-
level classification categorizes species in a broader sense. For example,
a lion and tiger fall into the species category ‘mammal’—despite their
many differences, they share a cluster of properties and relations caused
by mechanisms that reflect for example, the sharing of a common an-
cestor.
Like the essentialist theory, the HPC account of natural kinds
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“retains a distinction between the observable properties of a kind and
its explanatory core, but this core (i.e., the homeostatic mechanism)
need not be either irreducible or intrinsic” (Pöyhönen, 2016, 150). An
important feature of the HPC-Theory is that natural kinds are defined as
the kinds of things that result from reliable and successful scientific
practices. Boyd (1991) explains that because members of a particular
natural kind category share a cluster of relevant properties or relations,
they permit scientists to make legitimate generalizations and further-
more, aid in development of reliable intervention strategies that in turn,
ground scientific explanations and predictions for the discovery of other
natural kinds. In this sense, the mind-independent aspect of natural
kinds is to some extent abandoned. According to Boyd (1991), a mind-
dependent aspect plays a role in classification because scientists use
methods that best serve their investigative aims. Boyd (1999, 1991)
refers to this process that is central to the HPC-Theory, as “accom-
modation” in order to describe the connection between explanatory
practices of kind use and the practice of kind category construction. The
construction of natural kind categories is accommodated by the kinds of
things that are epistemically useful since they feature in successful
scientific practices. However, mind-independency is supposedly re-
tained in the sense that natural kinds track causal structures in the
world.
3.3. Mechanistic property clusters
The HPC-Theory has been adopted and slightly modified by a group
of philosophers of science seeking to link psychiatric disorders to me-
chanisms in the brain, and as a way to construct a framework for
psychiatric classification. Kendler et al. (2011) recognize psychiatric
disorders as naturally occurring features of the causal structure of the
brain and propose that they exist as ‘mechanistic property clusters’
(MPCs). They speculate that the symptoms that manifest as psychiatric
disorders arise from groups of properties that co-occur, and whose co-
occurrence is sustained by dysfunctional causal mechanisms (Kendler
et al., 2011). Furthermore, they claim that these mechanisms span and
interact across multiple levels—from the genetic to the environmental
level—and produce detectable symptoms (Kendler et al., 2011). Causal
interactions are also believed to occur between symptoms that arise at
different levels, meaning some individuals who are diagnosed with
depression, for example, and show signs of insomnia and guilt, will be
predisposed to tiredness and suicidal ideation, respectively (Kendler
et al., 2011). Specifically, they state that MPCs “are useful for predic-
tion, explanation and control precisely because the kinds are sustained
by causal mechanisms” (Kendler et al., 2011, p. 1147). Thus, they be-
lieve that characterizing psychiatric disorders as MPCs will enable the
discovery of relevant properties that such disorders share, and in turn,
will yield successful explanations of their etiology (see recent work by
Khalidi, 2015; Borsboom et al., 2018; Neilsen & Ward, 2020; Shaffner &
Tabb for alternative viewpoints).
3.4. Constructed kinds
In stark contrast to natural kinds realists, constructivists about
natural kinds reject the idea that there are mind-independent divisions
in the natural world out there to be discovered. They instead contend
that natural kind categories are socially constructed—that is, they are
human inventions. Proponents of constructivism typically defend three
theses about natural kinds: (1) purported natural kinds do not reflect
the natural structure of the world; (2) categories are constructed and
shaped by social, cultural, political, historical, and economic factors;
and (3) the construction of categories is not objective; rather, they are
contingent on the ‘interest-driven’ classificatory practices relative to
different scientific disciplines.7 Perhaps the most prominent
constructivist within the philosophical literature on natural kinds is
Hacking (1990, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1995b, 1999a, 1999b, 2004,
2007). As Hacking (1999a, 33) eloquently puts it, “the world does not
come quietly wrapped up in facts. Facts are the consequences of ways in
which we represent the world.” Specifically, he contends that different
systems of classification “are not determined by how the world is, but
are convenient ways in which to represent it” (Hacking, 1999a, 33).
Hacking uses the concept of ‘human kinds’ to distinguish phe-
nomena under study in human sciences like psychology and psychiatry
from the kinds of phenomena under study in the natural sciences like
physics and biology. The study of human behaviors, mental conditions,
temperaments, societal groups, and so on, involves classification sys-
tems that group individuals into categories such as ‘alcoholic’, ‘hyper-
active child’, and ‘refugee’ (Hacking, 1995b, 1999a). Hacking notes that
these “human kind” categories share the same epistemic function as
natural kind categories in that they involve the use of “classifications
that could be used to formulate general truths about people; general-
izations sufficiently strong that they seem like laws about people, their
actions, or their sentiments” (Hacking, 1995a, 352). However, he ar-
gues that unlike natural kinds, human kinds do not track a stable nat-
ural order (Hacking, 1995a, 1995b, 1999a; Kendig, 2016a, 2016b). The
reason, according to Hacking (1995a), is that human kinds are subject
to what he dubs ‘looping-effects’—interactive causal relationships that
occur between classified individuals and classificatory practices.
In the case of human kinds, when an individual is classified they may
become aware of it, and “they can make tacit or even explicit choices,
adapt or adopt ways of living so as to fit or get away from the very
classification that may be applied to them” (Hacking, 1995a, 32). De-
pending on whether the classification is perceived negatively or posi-
tively by society, individuals may be motivated to change accordingly.
Hacking (1995a, 1999a) contends that because people change their
behaviors and attitudes over time, looping effects not only undermine
the classification but also demonstrate that contrary to traditional
models of natural kinds—wherein a single set or cluster of properties or
relations are required—people simply do not conform to a single human
kind category. Moreover, it is not only the individuals themselves who
respond to being classified, people around them also respond and have
an impact, too. Hacking (1995b, 103) argues that looping effects occur
within the “larger matrix of institutions and practices surrounding the
classification.” For example, in the case of hyperactive children, their
behaviors may change in response to the actions, behaviors, and atti-
tudes of their parents, peers, teachers, and doctors. In such cases, ca-
tegories emerge and shift in response to social institutions and norms.
Advocates of looping effects use them to argue that mental disorders
are not natural kinds (see Cooper, 2004 for an alternative view). Op-
ponents charge constructivists with neglecting scientific evidence that
some mental illnesses are attributable to underlying biological factors,
not social convention. Khalidi (2013), for example, suggests that
Hacking's constructivist stance is misguided in positing a dichotomy
between the natural sciences and the human sciences. Khalidi claims
instead that natural kinds are common in the human sciences because
the descriptive categories they use rely on the capacity of inductive
practices to successfully track objective structures of reality (Khalidi,
2013; see also Dupré, 2004; Guala, 2010). Kendler et al. (2011, 1145)
suggest classification in psychiatry “should seek common biological,
psychological and social factors that warrant extrapolation across cul-
tural and historical contexts.” Generally speaking, realists about natural
kinds have not been swayed by Hacking's arguments and still hold fast
to the possibility of discovering natural kinds of some form in the special
7 Many philosophers who advocate for natural kinds believe that convention
(footnote continued)
and interest-relative pragmatism play some role in shaping scientific classifi-
cation and thus in the identification of the kinds that areas of science discover.
In psychiatry in particular, some scholars (Neilsen, 2020) contend that clinical
diagnoses necessarily involve value judgments.
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and human sciences.
From one vantage point, natural kinds and constructed kinds may
be regarded as being at opposite ends of the kind continuum—either
our categories pick out real mind-independent natural divisions in the
causal structure of the world or all of the kinds picked out by human
engineered concepts are mind-dependent. There is, however, a growing
consensus among natural kinds realists that human interests, aims,
values and practices play an ineliminable role in kind individuation in
science—a role that given the satisfaction of certain constraints, need
not compromise the reality or naturalness of those kinds (e.g., Boyd,
2000; Craver, 2009; Franklin-Hall, 2015; Kendig, 2016a; Khalidi, 2013;
Weiskopf, 2020). This has prompted some philosophers to replace the
designator “natural kinds” with, for example, “practical kinds” (e.g.,
Zachar, 2002, 2014, 2015), “investigative kinds” (e.g., Brigandt, 2003,
2012; Griffiths, 2004) and “categorical bottlenecks” (Franklin-Hall,
2015). We end this section by briefly considering some of these de-
velopments.
Advocates of essentialism and homeostatic or mechanistic property
clusters insist that we should strive to build classifications grounded on
features that are shared across category members, discovered by em-
pirical investigation, and not constructed by fiat. Pragmatists, however,
point out that scientific concepts often have practical goals associated
with different individuals and organizations and just so long as these
categories allow the fulfillment of these goals, they may be regarded as
“natural” (e.g., Franklin-Hall, 2015). This “practical kinds” or in-
strumentalist approach is far less restrictive than other theories of
natural kinds, because it allows a wider range of categories to be con-
sidered natural while easily ruling out arbitrary categories that can be
shown to serve no practical aims (Franklin-Hall, 2015; Zachar, 2002).
According to such accounts, classificatory practices proceed as scien-
tists assess which categories best meet their practical goals, such as
discovering and establishing the etiology of disorders, reliable diag-
noses, and effective treatments (Kendler et al., 2011; Zachar, 2002,
2014, 2015). Categories are judged exclusively on the basis of their
practical success, rather than their correspondence to a mind-in-
dependent reality. Peter Zachar, for example, argues that mental illness
categories are best understood as constituted by an interaction “be-
tween what the world produces and what we find useful to notice”
(Zachar, 2015, 289). Critics of the practical kinds view argue, however,
that practical successes sometimes outweigh matters of fact when
adopting classifications, and that shifts in interests and goals may
prompt changes to classification systems in ways that compromise the
naturalness of the kinds they pick out (citation).
The idea that scientific classification “reflects the immense variety
of human interests,” is an indication to some philosophers that there is a
plurality of ways to classify natural kinds (Dupré, 1981, p. 80). Ac-
cording to John Dupré's (1993, 18) notion of promiscuous realism “there
are countless legitimate, objectively grounded ways of classifying ob-
jects in the world.” Defenders of pluralism about natural kinds ac-
knowledge that natural kinds are not only found within the natural
sciences (Dupré, 1993; Khalidi, 2013). Pluralists also take into account
the diversity of ways in which scientific disciplines develop constructs
for investigative purposes (e.g., Dupré, 1993; Kendig, 2016a, 2016b;
Khalidi, 2013; Sullivan, 2017a, 2017b). For example, schizophrenia is
studied by geneticists, doctors, sociologists, anthropologists, philoso-
phers, neuroscientists and so on—each of which analyse constructs of
schizophrenia in different ways and for different purposes. Thus, it is
argued that there are diverse ways of classifying kinds, and in some
instances, there may be kinds that fit into more than one natural kind
category (e.g., Kendig, 2016a, 2016b)—kinds that cross-cut each other
or overlap (e.g., Dupré, 1993; Khalidi, 2013, 1998). As Khalidi con-
tends, “if classification is always relative to certain interests, we would
expect some [categories] to reorganize some of the same entities in
different ways without displacing existing ones” (Khalidi, 1998, p. 42).
Philosophical understandings of the concept of natural kinds and
debates about the usefulness of the very concept for understanding
scientific classification and conceptual change are still evolving as
philosophers of science expand the focus of their inquiry to a number of
diverse and interdisciplinary areas of science (see e.g., Bolker, 2013;
Brigandt, 2003, 2010, 2012; Bursten, 2016; Godman, 2013; Kendig,
2016a, 2016b; Ludwig, 2017; Ludwig, 2018; Muszynski & Malaterre,
2020; Ruphy, 2010; Slater, 2015; Slater, 2013; Tabb, 2019; Tsou, 2013;
Zachar, 2000). Natural kinds realists have expressed optimism that just
so long as the aims of classification in a given scientific domain are
broadly epistemic, natural kinds in some form (e.g., HPC, MPC) will be
in the offing (e.g., Boyd, 2019; Kendler et al., 2011; Khalidi, 2013), and
there may be different epistemically admirable ways of conceptually
carving up the world that cross-cut each other (e.g., Khalidi, 2013).
However, debates about the status of kinds in psychology, neuroscience
and psychiatry are on-going. As we explain in Section 4, setting aside
the possibility that the kinds of things under study in these areas of
science (e.g., mental illnesses, cognitive functioning) may be subject to
looping effects (Hacking, 1995a, 1995b) or the reactivity (e.g. Harris &
Lahey, 1982) of experimental subjects (e.g., humans, non-human pri-
mates, rodents), the “kinding practices” (e.g., Kendig, 2016b) of in-
vestigators also have important implications for classification and the
status of kinds in these areas of science (see also e.g., Chang, 2004,
Chang, 2017 on natural kinds and “epistemic iteration”).
4. Scientific practice, coordinated pluralism and coordinated
kinds
If we synthesize the ideas of those philosophers we have considered
in the previous two sections, classification in science may be roughly
described as proceeding in stages. First, conventional “folk” categories
are abandoned for descriptive systems of classification that specify
criteria of application for scientific terms based on objectively verifiable
features of objects. These classification systems do not track “natural
kinds”, but they are regarded as important starting points for causal
discovery insofar as they ensure scientists hailing from different theo-
retical backgrounds, who take themselves to be interested in roughly
the same domain of phenomena, share a set of conceptual categories in
common. These consensus-based operationalized concepts may then
serve as a basis for integrating results from multiple different domains
of scientific inquiry. Then, descriptive classification systems gradually
are replaced or updated in light of causal discovery with an eye towards
categories that facilitate explanation, prediction, control and under-
standing. Some philosophers believe that the resulting categories track
“natural kinds” and have put forward different understandings of this
concept, conceding that the kinds that are discovered are partly due to
our “workmanship” in accommodating our concepts to the world (e.g.,
Boyd, 2000).
This account of how classification proceeds in science is highly
idealized; if natural kinds are ultimately the goal of science, in-
vestigations into the nature of scientific practice reveal that classificatory
practices and kind discovery in science do not follow this logical tra-
jectory (e.g., Andersen, 2010; Bloch-Mullins, 2020a, 2020b, Chang,
2004, 2012, 2011; Hacking, 1992b; Feest & Steinle, 2012; Kendig,
2016a, 2016b; Nersessian, 2008). Numerous philosophers of science
and scientists have noted that exploratory and hypothesis-driven re-
search often proceed in science without a firm grasp of what the objects
of inquiry are nor how the kinds of things under study fit into some
broader taxonomy of kinds (e.g., Anderson, 2015; Brigandt, 2003,
2020; Chang, 2004, 2012; Colaço, 2020; Feest, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012,
2017; Feest & Steinle, 2012; Griffiths, 1997, 2004; Haueis & Slaby,
2017; Kendig, 2016a, 2016b; Muszynski & Malaterre 2020;
Rheinberger, 1997; Sullivan, 2009, 2017b, Sullivan, 2010; Sullivan,
2019; Sullivan, 2020).
Especially in interdisciplinary areas of science, such as evolutionary
development biology, cognitive neuroscience, criminology, clinical
psychiatry, ethnobiology neurobiology to name only a handful, we
encounter a host of practices that do not appear to be aligned with the
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natural kinds ideal. Consider an example from translational cognitive
neuroscience, which aims to translate findings about the mechanisms of
impairments in cognitive functioning from animal models of disease to
humans suffering from these impairments. It is widely recognized that
many mental illnesses, neurodegenerative diseases and brain disorders
(e.g., concussion) are accompanied by impairments in cognitive func-
tions like memory, attention, and decision-making. Patients with these
disorders may have difficulty dividing, switching or maintaining at-
tention, remembering objects, persons and locations or adjusting their
behavior when appropriate. In the first two decades of the 21st century,
two major initiatives were established in the United States with an eye
towards propelling forward the discovery of novel therapeutics for
these cognitive impairments. Although the Research Domain Criteria
Project (e.g., Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013; Morris and Cuthbert, 2012;
Sanislow et al., 2010; Insel et al., 2010) is the better known of the two,
our focus here is on the Cognitive Neuroscience Treatment Research to
Improve Cognition in Schizophrenia (CNTRICS) initiative (e.g., Carter &
Barch, 2007; Moore et al., 2013). This initiative variously brought to-
gether preclinical translational behavioral neuroscientists, clinical re-
searchers, cognitive neuroscientists working with humans and/or an-
imal models, systems neuroscientists and members of the
pharmaceutical industry to (1) identify the physiological, genetic and
developmental mechanisms that underlie cognitive impairments (e.g.,
deficits in memory, attention) in Schizophrenia and to (2) locate ef-
fective therapeutics for treating such impairments. CNTRICS was aimed
in particular at developing testing methods (behavioral assays) for as-
sessing cognition and cognitive impairments and their mechanisms in
animal models of disease (rodents) that would facilitate the translation
of pre-clinical findings to human patients in the form of effective
therapeutic interventions (e.g., Hvoslef-Eide, Nilsson, Saksida, &
Bussey, 2015; Moore et al., 2013).
Across a number of large-scale and working group meetings, sci-
entists Deanna Barch and Cameron Carter, who spearheaded the
CNTRICS initiative, identified in collaboration with other investigators,
a number of hurdles to their explanatory, predictive and therapeutic
goals. In order to illustrate the nature of these hurdles, consider an
example. One cognitive function that is widely believed to be impaired
in Schizophrenia and other mental illnesses is cognitive control
(McTeague, Goodkind, & Etkin, 2016, 2017). This concept is variously
defined as “the top-down modulation of cognitive processes based on
higher-order representations such as goals or plans” (https://www.
cognitiveatlas.org), “the process by which goals or plans influence be-
haviour” (https://www.nature.com/subjects/cognitive-control), and “a
system that modulates the operation of other cognitive and emotional
systems, in the service of goal-directed behavior, when prepotent
modes of responding are not adequate to meet the demands of the
current context” (https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research/research-
funded-by-nimh/rdoc/constructs/cognitive-control.shtml). These gen-
eral definitions of the construct are not identical and allow for the
possibility of a wide array of phenomena to be classified as instances of
cognitive control. A number of different tasks, including the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task (WCST), the digit span task, and the Porteus maze
test, to name only a few, may be used to study cognitive control in
humans (see www.cognitiveatlas.org). Task demands differ across these
tasks, leaving open the possibility that the tasks measure different kinds
of cognitive processes. The WCST, for example, has been used to
measure other cognitive functions including task switching and set
shifting (https://www.cognitiveatlas.org). This is suggestive that dif-
ferent investigators have different intuitions about what cognitive
function the WCST actually measures. On one version of the WCST, a
subject must sort a set of cards containing different stimuli into separate
piles without knowing precisely which stimulus dimensions are to be
used to sort the cards. The subject is required to rely on input from the
task administrator, who only indicates whether a given choice of
sorting is correct or incorrect. The subject also may be tested under
conditions in which they have learned one set of rules, but then the
rules are changed and they have to learn a new set of rules also ex-
clusively on the basis of administrator feedback (https://www.
cognitiveatlas.org). The task has a number of different parameters,
and investigators who use it are at liberty to vary stimulus parameters
and other features of the experimental protocol as they deem relevant
to their research goals.
The aforementioned features are not unique to the concept of cog-
nitive control or the WCST (see e.g., Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013; Hommel
et al., 2019; Irvine, 2012; Poldrack, 2010; Poldrack et al., 2011;
Stinson, 2009; Sullivan, 2009, 2017a, 2017b). In fact, researchers in-
volved in the CNTRICS initiative identified a number of important ob-
stacles to translational research that are generally applicable across
cognitive concepts and cognitive assessment tools used in con-
temporary neuroscience. To summarize, it is not uncommon for in-
vestigators hailing from different theoretical traditions to use the same
concepts to individuate kinds of phenomena, but to mean different
things by these concepts. In other words, concepts in neuroscientific
areas that study human and non-human animal cognition lack interrater
reliability, or consistent criteria of application across investigators (see
Haslam, 2013; Hempel, 1965). This is a barrier to discovery insofar as it
promotes misunderstandings among researchers who may otherwise
regard themselves as engaged in a common explanatory project. There
is also no widespread consensus about which tests or tasks should be
used to assess which cognitive functions and investigators have the
freedom to modify various aspects of the protocols used in conjunction
with tests and tasks as they deem appropriate to their explanatory goals
(e.g., Poldrack, 2010; Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016; Sullivan, 2009). A
related issue is that cognitive assessment tools used to individuate kinds
of cognitive functions and intervention tools used to probe for causes
are often not standardized across investigators. Given that even subtle
differences in experimental techniques may result in large differences in
the data such techniques produce, it is an open question whether results
from different experiments purportedly investigating a single cognitive
process may be integrated or synthesized into the same explanation of
the same phenomenon (e.g., Sullivan, 2009).
What implications might the aforementioned features of scientific
practice have for the discovery of so-called natural kinds in transla-
tional areas of cognitive neuroscience (as well as in other areas of sci-
ence where we encounter similar issues)? One possibility is that con-
ceptual and methodological pluralism is so rampant and unbridled that
investigators are not progressing towards anything like the natural
kinds ideal (e.g., Sullivan, 2016b). However, researchers involved in
the CNTRICS initiative do not regard widespread conceptual and
methodological pluralism as an adequate stopping point for transla-
tional research. Rather, as we explain in the remainder of this section,
they may be understood as advocating for a set of consensus-based
strategies and epistemic benchmarks for translational research that may
at best be aligned with a property clusters account of the natural kinds
ideal (just so long as that account is supplemented with descriptive
details about the nature of scientific practice).
In order to overcome conceptual and methodological hurdles to the
success of translational research, CNTRICS researchers sought to reach
consensus on (a) a set of constructs designating cognitive functions and
sub-functions and (b) a set of tasks that could be used to investigate
these functions in humans and animal models (e.g., Barch et al., 2009;
Carter & Barch, 2007; Barch & Carter, 2008; Carter, Kerns, & Cohen,
2009; Carter, Barch, & Buchanan, 2008; Moore et al., 2013). Two se-
lection criteria for functions and tasks included construct validity and
neurocognitive validity (e.g., Hvoslef-Eide et al., 2015). Specifically,
across the contexts of in-person meetings and web-based surveys,
CNTRICS participants were asked to identify “constructs that have
prominence in the field of cognitive neuroscience and substantial pro-
mise for delineating elementary cognitive processes” (i.e., construct
validity), which “may be more closely connected to neural systems”
(i.e., neurocognitive validity) (Carter et al., 2008, 5). Yet, CNTRICS par-
ticipants were open to the possibility that the constructs and definitions
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they selected “were only one way of ‘carving nature at its joints’”
(Carter et al., 2008, 9) and that other cognitive constructs were pos-
sible.
From the perspective of CNTRICS researchers, satisfying the criteria
of construct validity and neurocognitive validity with respect to con-
ceptual categories designating cognitive functions is necessary but not
sufficient for the success of translational research. Researchers also
must agree on a broader set of epistemic benchmarks that their cognitive
assessment, intervention and data analysis tools must meet and a set of
best practices for translational research. For example, an additional
hurdle to translating results from rodent to human cognitive assessment
studies and integrating findings that apply across species, is the mis-
match between the tools used to assess cognition in rodents and humans
(e.g., Bussey et al., 1994; Bussey et al., 2012). Many researchers in-
volved in the CNTRICS initiative agree that the more similar the tasks
for assessing cognition are across species, i.e., face validity, the more
likely it is that the same cognitive functions and neural circuits will be
involved. Yet even if the tasks used to probe cognitive functions in
different species look similar, this does not guarantee they are suitable
for individuating cognitive capacities (construct validity (e.g.,
Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Slaney, 2017; Shadish et al., 2002; Sullivan,
2019) and identifying neural circuits that mediate task performance
(neurocognitive validity, e.g., Hvoslef-Eide et al., 2015). CNTRICS parti-
cipants reached some consensus that construct validity and neurocog-
nitive validity with respect to cognitive assessment tools for use in
humans and rodents are essential (e.g., Carter & Barch, 2007).
Achieving these types of validity is, however, an iterative process, as
findings from exploratory and hypothesis-driven experiments prompt
task refinement and/or construct revision (e.g., NIMH, 2016; Shadish
et al., 2002; Sullivan, 2016a; Hvoslef-Eide et al., 2015).
The success of translational research is also thought to require es-
tablishing that task performance across species recruits the same neural
circuits. This is referred to as translational neurocognitive validity (e.g.,
Hvoslef-Eide et al., 2015), which is fundamental for predicting whether
functional outcomes of treatment interventions observed in one species
will be similar in another. Ideally, translational researchers want to be
able to predict that a treatment that works in rescuing a cognitive
deficit in a rodent model of disease will be effective in rescuing that
deficit in human clinical populations. Cognitive assessment tools should
also be sensitive to dose-dependent effects of drugs on cognitive abil-
ities, so as to increase the likelihood that a drug that ameliorates cog-
nitive impairments in a rodent model has a greater chance of having a
positive impact in the human case. Achieving translational neurocog-
nitive validity also is an iterative process, as it requires investigators
working in human and non-human animal cognition to move back and
forth to refine human and rodent tasks in order to facilitate translation
while ensuring that other dimensions of validity are maintained.
These varied dimensions of validity are emphasized in the CNTRICS
literature. They are all intimately related, however, to another im-
portant desiderata for experiments: reliability. An experiment is ideally
supposed to leave an investigator epistemically better off than she
would have been had she never run that experiment. Improving one's
epistemic situation by means of an experiment requires that the ex-
periment be reliable or capable of producing data requisite to adjudicate
among competing hypotheses about a cognitive capacity of interest and
its mechanisms or the efficacy of a drug on improving an impairment in
that capacity. Every cognitive assessment task or tool is one component
of a broader experimental protocol or set of standardized operating
procedures (SOP) that specifies the steps that must followed from the
beginning to the end of each experiment in which that task or tool is
used. The specified steps are ideally supposed to rule out the possibility
of confounds, experimenter error and artifacts (see e.g., Mayo, 1996;
Schikore, 2019; Sullivan, 2018; Sullivan, 2020). Experiments may be
more or less reliable; increasing the reliability of an experiment is
contingent upon an investigator actively thinking about and probing for
potential kinds of confounds that may occur during the processes of
data collection and analysis. We have argued previously that adequate
probing for errors requires “perspectival pluralism” (e.g., Giere, 2010;
Sullivan, 2014, 2018; Wimsatt, 2007) and methodological pluralism
(e.g., Sullivan, 2018) as input from investigators with different theo-
retical backgrounds and diverse technical expertise is used as a basis for
itemizing potential confounds and errors to which experiments may be
subject (e.g., Sullivan, 2014, 2018). A lack of reliability in exploratory
experiments may jeopardize knowledge production and discovery; in
hypothesis-driven experiments it may negatively impact the ability to
adjudicate among competing hypotheses about the effects under study
in the laboratory, and ultimately jeopardize the ability to generalize
results beyond that context.
Additionally, experimental results must be reproducible. Many labs
must run the same experiments in order to determine whether the ef-
fects observed in a single lab are real or idiosyncratic to a given ex-
perimental context. Researchers must also have good grounds for
thinking that the same phenomenon is being investigated when dif-
ferent research groups use the same cognitive tasks. For all these con-
ditions to be possible, CNTRICS researchers agreed that the cognitive
assessment tools used in humans and/or rodents, including the oper-
ating procedures/protocols used in conjunction with them, must be
standardized across research groups (See also International Brain
Laboratory, 2017).
Meeting the aforementioned benchmarks is not possible in a single
laboratory or research study; rather, it requires extensive collaboration
and coordination of research practices within and across research
groups working at the same and different levels of analysis and with
different species. Such groups must include investigators having diverse
theoretical backgrounds and technical expertise. A significant amount
of resources and time are also required to gradually hit these bench-
marks and to reach the point at which discovery of novel therapeutic
interventions is possible. We refer to such collaboration as “coordinated
pluralism” (Sullivan, 2017a; Mattu, 2020)and believe that just so long
as these kinds of epistemic benchmarks are sought after in science, what
may be discovered in conjunction with such practices may best be
understood as “coordinated kinds”. We think the concept of “co-
ordination”, in contrast to “accommodation” (e.g., Boyd, 2000), better
emphasizes the kind of intensive collaborative work required on the
part of scientists to progress towards something like the natural kinds
ideal. To the extent that coordinated pluralism exists in science, the
coordinated kinds associated with it will be more constrained groupings
maintained by subsets of practitioners who aim to align their practices
in specific ways to meet their explanatory and/or predictive goals (see
Ankeny & Leonelli, 2015, 2016 on “scientific repertoires” and
Kutschenko, 2011 on “epistemic hubs”). We believe that while con-
ceptual and methodological pluralism are widespread in science, co-
ordinated pluralism, in contrast, is quite rare.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we provided an historical overview of the principles
that philosophers have claimed have and ought to guide the develop-
ment of classification systems in science. We went on to illustrate,
through a survey of relevant philosophical literature, that philosophers
of science have been historically interested in concept of natural kinds.
However, given differences in the kinds studied in different areas of
science, a number of different understandings of the concept of natural
kind have been put forward and debates about the status of kinds in
many areas of science are still on-going. We also considered a number
of different understandings of kinds that have been developed to ac-
commodate the unstable and more complex causal structure of kinds
under study in “special sciences” like biology, psychology and psy-
chiatry. In the final section of the paper, we emphasized that success in
achieving “the natural kinds ideal” in some areas of science appears to
be contingent on the conceptual and methodological practices of in-
vestigators and we described how the strategy of “coordinated
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pluralism” might at best facilitate the discovery of “coordinated kinds”
in science, which may be as close as some areas of science get to
“natural” kinds.
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